Stoicism is a school of philosophy of ancient Greece , founded by Zeno of Larnaca in 301 BC. AD is a subsequent Hellenistic philosophical current that passed through the centuries, been transformed (notably Chrysippus in Greece and Rome with Cicero , Seneca , Epictetus , Marcus Aurelius ) and then held various influences, ranging the Classical period in Europe (particularly in the ^seventeenth century , from Rene Descartes ) to the present.

This philosophy calls for the practice of meditation exercises that lead to live in harmony with the nature and reason to achieve wisdom and happiness as envisaged ataraxia. There is a lack of passion, which takes the form of an absence of suffering.

This article offers a description of general features of the doctrine, notwithstanding the significant nuances of a Stoic to another.

Foreword

We are left only fragments of the early Stoics ( Zeno of Larnaca (344 - 262), Cleanthes ), and the only complete works we have are those of Seneca , Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cicero has given us the proceedings of the Hellenistic period that tell us about the ancient Stoicism. The opponents of the Stoics ( Plutarch , Sextus Empiricus ) have also left accounts of the thought. What we can learn in logic , in physics and ethics shows original and powerful minds that have shaped Western history until today.

Stoicism is one of the main philosophies of the Hellenistic period , with Epicureanism and skepticism. This current rationalist related particularly Heraclitus (idea of logos universal), the cynical ( cition Zeno was a pupil of Crates ), includes some aspects of the thought of Aristotle.

Etymology

The name comes from Greek Stoicism Stoa Poikile or the followers of the portico. Indeed Zeno taught his lessons under a portico of the Agora in Athens where the Stoics came together and taught. Hence it is that stoicism is also called the school of the Porch. This word means today, in current usage, the appearance moral of this philosophy means in effect by a stoic attitude of indifference to the pain and courage in facing the challenges of life.

Wisdom and Philosophy

Stoic philosophy is a coherent whole: it is a philosophy of all who wants to consciously systematic, which is one of the characteristics of ancient systems of thought ^{Definitions of wisdom and philosophy}

The wisdom ( sophia ) is the knowledge of scientific things divine and human .

According to the distinction of Seneca , this wisdom is the property of the mind human reached its perfection, while the philosophy is the love of wisdom and aspiration towards it through practice and theory " The philosophy behind where the other succeeded. " It is thus the practice ( askesis ) of art ( techne ) which is useful for the unit and the highest degree of virtue.

The philosophy is divided into three parts, following the division of virtues to their generic level: virtue physical , virtue ethics and virtue logic.

Divisions of Philosophy

Philosophical discourse has three parts: the physical is a search on the world and the objects it contains, the ethics , which concerns the action , the logic (or dialectic ), for the speech. Each of these parts is in turn divided into several parts (these divisions are outlined in relevant sections). This general division, according to Diogenes Laertius , was invented by Zeno of Larnaca in discourse processing, and was revived by Chrysippus of Soli , Diogenes of Babylon and Posidonius . It seems that Cleanthes has deviated from this division: he gives six the dialectic , the rhetoric , ethics, politics , physics, theology.

These parties are called species, genera (or types of theorems ) or premises following the philosophers . The Stoics used to describe the partition of philosophy, several comparisons that reflect disagreements within the school:

• The first is that the physics which is the center:
  • Philosophy is like an egg: the logic is the shell, the white, ethics and physics, yellow.

• According to three others is the ethic that holds the main square:
  • Philosophy is a field fertile land is the physical fruits, ethics and the wall surrounding logic.
  • Finally they compare philosophy to a living being, which differs from the previous comparison to emphasize the parts of philosophy are not separable, for example, for Posidonius : The physics is his blood and flesh, the logic and his bones tendons, the ethics is its soul .
  • Finally, for Seneca , ethics "is the heart" of philosophy .

The image of the living being seems to suggest that the logic is not an instrument or an accessory part, intended to protect only the basics: physical and / or ethics. It is not subject to ethics or physics as one party is at its all (like the shell is yellow, or as the wall is the fruit, protecting them both). It is the first part of philosophy , and not part of the game.

If we follow Posidonius and the testimony of Ammonius on this point, then all three parties are both distinct and interdependent, indivisible. However, the texts are not clear on the question of how these parties are parties: are they the party of "philosophy" , or are these parts of "philosophical discourse"-is only given that apart from philosophical discourse, there is life-philosophy ? If we stick to what relates Seneca , as well as the cosmos is one, the philosophy is one and undivided in itself. It appears as the wise. But for the philosopher (the apprentice-wise), which may not yet have a synoptic view, it is useful to distinguish the parties. In this case, these parts (logic, physics, ethics) would be least parts of philosophy, that parts of the learning philosophy.

For some Stoics, there is no hierarchy between these types and they taught together because they are mixed, but others start with the logic ( cition Zeno , Chrysippus ), by the ethics ( Diogenes of Ptolemais ) or by physical ( Pantios of Rhodes , Posidonius ) (Posidonius).

Science, instruments of the wise

The wise man seeks and knows the causes of natural things, the science will be an assistant for him. But as any auxiliary, it is not part of what it is an instrument and aid ( Seneca , Letters, 88, 25 - 28). The science is not, for the Stoic, a part of wisdom. That will then inform the wise? If we follow Seneca , he will know for example the system of the body celestial, their power and nature, but the wise Stoic deals with general principles, not the accumulation of knowledge or specific questions of fact. In all things, the philosophy will therefore ask anyone anything, but gives the first principles to other sciences (with mathematics , for example): the specialized sciences it means. The philosophy and built all his work alone.

Philosophy as a science, also differs from the skill, abilities that the Stoics called "occupations" (epitedeumata): Music, Literature, horseback riding, etc.. And they characterize as "a method that by means of an art or a part of an art, leads to the realm of virtue "(cf. Stobaeus , II, 67). These occupations have an instrumental value for the wise, which he alone possesses the virtuous habit.

Unit system Stoic

According to the treaty's fate Cicero , the notion of Fate (destiny) is common to all three parts of philosophy, in that it involves both physical (destiny is the principle of cosmic order), the Ethics (agreement of destiny with moral responsibility) and logic (problem statements about future contingents). The fatalism is a fundamental concept of stoicism:

"Lead me, Zeus and you Destiny, to which you have prepared for me. Because I follow without fail. But if I was getting nasty and if I did not want, I would not follow less. ( Cleanthes quoted by Epictetus , Handbook, end).

The ontology Stoic

Divisions of the to be

The ultimate type of metaphysics is called Stoic, according to Seneca (Letters, 58, 13 - 15) "something", but according to Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors, VIII, 32), the supreme genre would be the "existing". However, despite this divergence, it is generally agreed that the Stoics divide things in general existing and subsisting. ( Galen , In the medical method, X)

Is "something" everything in nature exists or not. The something contrary to the "non-something", ie, according to the Stoics, universals. All are existing bodies. The kind of non-existing property and the intangible things in the mind , formed by the false thought , like centaurs and giants, and generally everything that makes an impression on the faculty director without a substance ( Seneca , Letters, 58, 13 - 15). These intangibles are "surviving" - for example, a fiction in the spirit is real only in thought. The latter case seems nevertheless show the existence of an additional division of something: that which is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. The body alone are called existing.

The "few things" are either body (existing) or intangible (remaining).

The Stoics distinguish four kinds of body: the substrate , qualifier (either common or particularly), the readiness, willingness relatively ( Cilicia Simplicius , On Aristotle's Categories, 66).

They distinguish four types of intangibles: the speakable, the vacuum , place and time.

The existing individual entities are assets that belong to both the four kinds of body, but "something" is a single entity: to be something, be it a particular thing, tangible or intangible. Thus "something" is or subsisting or existing, is predicated only the existing bodies, but "something" is also predicated of intangibles.

Since the existence is among the Stoics, body, and that acting on a body is a body, the action is the attribute of only: virtue and knowledge are thus tangible realities. This ontology poses some problems to explain the causal action of an intangible asset on a body.

There are a few elements of this metaphysics in the nineteenth ^century in Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell.

The four kinds

Substrate

In its primordial sense, the substrate unskilled is equivalent to the area , but as in the philosophy of Aristotle , there is a meaning, something that may have qualified status of a substrate or the material relative something else.

Things qualified

The practitioner is a substance having certain qualities: prudence is a quality, individual cautious qualifier.

Things arranged in a certain way

These things are arranged in a certain way ...

Things arranged in a certain way in relation to something

This genus contains things that are characterized by an extrinsic relation. Provision also uncertain.

Intangibles

The first relates to the intangible semantics and logic (see this section below), while the other three physical.

The expressible (or expressed)

In Greek lekta. The Stoics distinguish vocalizations, the word (lexis) and language (logos). The vocalizations are sounds formed by the mouth, the word is a broadcast voice articulated phonemes , the language issue is a meaningful voice which is expressed by a state of affairs. These are statements of things that are said expressible. ( Diogenes Laertius , VII, 57). This speakable is defined:

" The vacuum

The vacuum, as the Stoics, is what can be occupied by an existing but not occupied ( Sextus Empiricus , Against the Professors, X, 3-4). According to Chrysippus ( Stobaeus , I, 161, 8 to 26), the vacuum is infinite. Indeed, there is no limit, and it has no limits and is therefore a remaining (ie an intangible) infinite, which receives a limit only if he happens to be busy.

Place

Although the world itself is in a limitless void, there is no vacuum and form a "continuous whole" characterized by "conspiracy and harmony of heavenly things with earthly things" (Diogenes Laertius, VII, 140). Within these limits, the place is an intangible, without a gap, defined as an interval always occupied by a body or another, one place is always filled a theater where bodies succeed or interpenetrate . What we now call "space" is characterized in the Stoics, not himself, but from the bodies that occupy it, in reality the show, by their mere presence, as what holds them and the different at a time. The space is said relatively stoic compared to its constituent bodies, both in what they are themselves in the distance they create in their vicinity.

Time

For the Stoics ( Cilicia Simplicius , On Aristotle's Categories, 350, 15 - 16), time is a dimension or an interval (diastema in Greek) or movement (as Zenon ), or the movement of the world (according Chrysippus). The time is "that dimension of the movement that we talk about measuring the speed and slowness. "(Definition of Chrysippus, in Stobaeus , I, 106).

All things move and are in time which is infinite in both directions of past and future. But time has two meanings: in a broad sense, only the present is here, as it actually exists, although it is intangible. The past and future are then subsistent beings because they are not there, they are not present. In a strict sense, no time is completely present, for all time is divisible ad infinitum.

Summary

Something (in Greek
Body				Intangible
Substrate	Qualified	Disposed	Willing relatively	Expressible	Empty	Location	Time

The logic

Section Summary Rhetoric The dialectic The expressible Proposals Simple propositions Proposals not simple Reasoning and proof

• Note on the formalization of reasoning: In this section, some arguments of the Stoics are formalized using modern symbols and can recommend the reader to read the article Calculation of proposals for an introduction to this logic.

Some Stoics ( Diogenes Laertius , VII, 41) divide the logic into two parts: the dialectic and rhetoric , others add that the definitions and criteria.

Rhetoric

The rhetoric is the science of speaking well in speeches. It is divided into three parts: parliamentary, judicial and panegyric , or invention, saying, plan and staging. They divide the rhetoric in the introduction, narration, reply to the opponents, epilogue.

The dialectic

Diogenes Laertius (VII, 41 - 44) gives two definitions of Stoic dialectic:

• dialectic is the science of proper discussion in the speeches with questions and answers;
• the dialectic is the science of what is true, what is wrong, and what is neither one nor the other.

It is divided into two areas: the signified and vocalizations, the place of the signified are in turn divided into impressions and impressions derived sayable (this part is exposed from the next section). The place of articulation for vocal emissions by letters, distinguishes the parts of speech, discusses solecisms , the barbarities , etc..

The expressible

The concept of expressible is the foundation of Stoic logic and is an intangible and, as such, it has been discussed in section The expressible in this article.

Proposals

Chrysippus , in his dialectical Definitions (quoted by Diogenes Laertius , VII, 65), defines the proposal as "what is true or false, or a complete state of affairs which, if he himself is concerned, may be assert. "

So for something to be true or false, it must be a speakable, a speakable complete a full sayable which is a proposal. ( Sextus Empiricus , Against the Professors, VIII, 74). A proposal is either true or false, a proposition that is not true is false ( Cicero , On Fate, 38). The contradictory of a proposition is a proposition which exceeds a negation: "It is day" No. It is day "(formalized in: p ~ p).

A true proposition is what is, and a false proposition is what is not ( Sextus Empiricus , Against the Professors, VIII, 84):

"Someone said 'it is day" seems to suggest it is day. Therefore, whether it's day, the proposal is proving true, and if it proves false. "( Diogenes Laertius , VII, 65).

The most general distinction between the proposals is that between simple propositions and proposals that are not simple ( Sextus Empiricus , Against the Professors, VIII, 93 - 98).

The simple propositions

"Are simple proposals that are not made from a unique proposition stated twice, for example," it's daytime, "" it's dark, "" Socrates speaks " Proposals not simple

TYPES OF PROPOSALS NOT SIMPLE

TYPE	Logical connectors	Equivalent contemporary logic	Example
Conditional proposition	IF	img class = "tex" alt = "p \ rightarrow q" src = "http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/2/c/f/2cf5c36392c6384e26d11ebb518c2699.png" />	"If it emerges, it is clear"
Proposal subconditionnelle	SINCE		"Since it emerged, it is clear"
Proposal conjunctiva	AND		"It's light and it is clear"
Disjunctive proposition Reasoning and proof According to Diogenes Laertius (VII, 76 - 81) the Stoics call argument (in Greek logos) that is constituted by one or more premises (in Greek lemma), an additional premise and a conclusion. Example: "If it emerges, it is light, but it's daytime, so it is light" (formalized in: ). Among the arguments, some valid, some invalid: those whose disabilities are the opposite of the conclusion does not conflict with the conjunction of the premises; there are two kinds of valid arguments: those who are simply valid; syllogistic ones: they are either unprovable or reducible to the unprovable. Involvement The Stoics give a very big role in the implication (conditional offer) invented by Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo. Indeed, for them is the logical form of any definition. For them, say: "Man is a mortal rational animal" ... it said: "If then In other words, any definition is an implication that is to say, a conditional proposition. (Cf.Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, XI, 8-11) The theory of knowledge Impressions The truth and certainty are in the most common perceptions that it is systematic. Thus the knowledge of her part- representation , or image ( phantasia ), printing of a real object in the soul (like the seal in wax Zeno). This is the first ruling on the things which may or may not be consent given voluntarily by the soul: if it is right, then it has an understanding, or perception ( katalepsis ) of the object that is immediate: a certainty of things as such. The feeling is so different from the image as it is an act of the mind. For that perception is true, the image must be faithful. The true picture, as a criterion of truth, is called comprehensive representation. It is passive, but capable of producing true consent and perception. The criteria of truth Science will be collecting solid and stable, unshakeable by reason : due to the strong support of certainties among themselves, their agreements rational. Thus the perception is the safe and complete science systematic and rational system of perceptions gathered by the experiment to a particular purpose or useful to life. Besides these sensible realities, there is no other knowledge. But alongside things sensitive , there is what there is to it. Thus the dialectic is she on the statements are true or false, relating to things. These statements say as a subject and an attribute expressed by a verb: Socrates walks. It is a simple decision that expresses a relation between facts, the latter expressed by a trial complex: it is light, it's day. It is therefore a de facto liaison between an antecedent and a consequent. Criticism This section is empty, insufficiently detailed or incomplete. Your help is welcome! The physical The principles of physics Stoic According to Diogenes Laertius (VII, 132), the Stoics divide physics in general in three areas: the world, the elements, the search for causes. But the study of nature is also divided according to specific places: the body, the principles and the elements, gods, and finally the boundaries, place and space. The world and nature The world is totally dominated by reason and accordingly each time the fullness of its perfection. Hence it is that the activity of reason is physical: there is only this that has the capacity to act or suffer (ie the body ). However, the reason acts, so it is a body. This sudden dominance of reason is also a body of material. Those are the two principles of physics: one is the case only, the other receives this causality without making any resistance. These two bodies unite and thus form the total mixture that explains the action of a blast material (tire) passing through the material to animate. Items This section is empty, insufficiently detailed or incomplete. Your help is welcome! The cosmic cycle and the Eternal Return The whole world has a cycle: fire, or active force ( Zeus ) absorbs and reduces itself all things. Then everything starts with the same after the end of the world into a conflagration ( apocatastasis or palingenesis ) where all things are returned to the divine substance. This conflagration is a purification of the world: the Soul of the world absorbs all matter in a perfect state by restoring a change according to nature. The primitive fire, the four elements are born and the world is born under the action of a divine breath. Then, by the fragmentation of breath, born individual beings who form the world system. It is this breath that is the unity of the world, browsing and maintaining its parts. This breath is a force , a thought and reason which has everything and that under the action of its tension to be there. This breath creates a sympathy between all parts of the world. As for the Earth , it is central, pressed on all sides by air. Everything starts exactly the same and no end. It is the Eternal Return. . Causality and destiny Main article: Destiny in the Stoics. Everything that happens is according to the universal nature, since everything works according to a total cause, which binds them all causes. Theology divides Stoics and Epicureans. (S) God (s) is (are) among the Epicureans: they are material and confined worlds while the rear is a Stoic pantheism : the order of nature (ie that of a sequence of causalities, a order of necessity) is identified with the action of what Marcus Aurelius called God, immanent in the material world (God is a body). This is the fate, destiny. This is expressed by the metaphor of the Dog and Cart. A dog pulling a cart is free to espouse the path of the carriage or to oppose it in vain. There is no fatalism here, but freedom of acquiescence or not the order of the world.The choice of representations associated with events depends on us, despite the fact that the order in which they occur is the fact of God , the will of nature. That depends on us, that the achievement of ataraxia , the absence of turmoil and passions of the soul with peace, inner peace, the Stoics equate to true happiness, living in perfect control our representations (ie conform to the natural order and divine) that the Stoic wise man acquires through its primary virtue: temperance. Thus theology and ethics Stoic call a man taken away, and some insight that has sometimes led to misinterpretations, some arguing that Stoic ethics lead to greater inactivity as did Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit : it combines the Stoic concept of the beautiful-soul (the Stoic consciousness for Hegel is able to deny representation without externalize and thus isolated from the solipsism ). Yet Seneca, in the constant Sage, warns against those who are beyond the reproach of inconstancy (ie self-indulgence) by their inactivity: if we break with all social ties, then our behavior will result in an absolute idleness thoughtless actions will result comparable churning of a child, the renunciation is a sign of weakness and cowardice, it is a leak yourself. The Ethics Section Summary The eigenfunctions Well Virtue Passions Focus on Ethics The wise Politics Stoic ethics is consistent with the physical. We know of several divisions of the Stoic ethics: " The eigenfunctions Main article: Kathekon. The term translates the Greek eigenfunction kathkon , which means "suitable", "duty" (in Latin officium). This word was used for the first time in this direction by Zeno , presumably in a book called From the eigenfunction ( Diogenes Laertius , VII 107). According to Diogenes, the term is derived from kata tinas hkein, "some suit" and it defines the specific function as an activity that is appropriate to constitutions that conform to nature (ibid.). This concept is the foundation of Stoic ethics; Archdme indeed said that the end is to live by bringing the functions specific to their perfection . Stobaeus (II, 85, 13 - 86) gives this definition of the tasks: "The consquentialit in life, something that, once it was done, has a reasonable justification. " The eigenfunctions apply to plants, animals and men. The Stoics distinguish two types of eigenfunctions, those are perfect, and those intermediaries. Cicero, in Terms of extreme good and evil (III), gives us a detailed analysis of this concept through the mouth of Cato. We like the first objects that are appropriate in nature, so we prefer that the parts of our body are well arranged and whole rather than weakened and distorted. So we know spontaneously distinguish what is consistent with the nature of what is otherwise: the first inclination of man is to things that are consistent with the nature. Hence, this distinction that has value is in agreement with nature and, therefore, is worthy of being selected. The opposite is worthless and must be rejected. The first function is to keep clean ourselves. Thus our body grows there by adapting its own faculties. Well The first property is the health , the welfare and everything that we can be useful Virtue For the Stoics, virtue and good are identical. Virtue is desirable for itself and is perfect: she is suffering from a stroke, in a comprehensive way, ie with all its parts. Its parts are, according to Zeno of Larnaca , aspects of a basic virtue of prudence. Who has a virtue has them all. Passions But the natural inclinations will be altered under the influence of social environment, and disturb the soul : what are the passions. However, if the soul is rational, every inclination is possible only if it receives the assent of reason. How to explain the passions? Passion is an irrational reason, a decision that robs us of our control: the practice and education eg persuade us that all pain is bad. But feel the physical pain and feel the punishment (moral evil) are two different things. Stoicism and shows that passions are bad reasons to believe. The radical opposition between reason and passions attributed to him is not accurate: if passions are bad, not as they are different in nature from reason, but because they are reasons rather lost; conversely, the reason may be seen as a passion right. Purpose of Ethics Main article: kathekon. The moral Stoic can be summarized as follows: everyone acts according to its nature ( kathekon ), but the wise man acts always so perfect (even, in exceptional circumstances, by acts that ordinary morality repugnant) the end of this morality is to live by choice in accordance with universal reason: to live according to nature, because everything happens by universal reason. This achieves the Apone (no bodily complaints) and ataraxia. But wisdom is an ideal very difficult to achieve. The wise Main article: wise. From there, the Stoics define a perfect model of conduct, embodied by the sage: the wise man chooses what conforms to nature; he performs a duty to perfect, ie it performs its own function; the wise man is perfect in everything; all other men are fools (Stults in Latin) There is no nuance between the perfection of wisdom and the foolishness of life of all men. We can therefore say that stoicism is seeking a transformation of the whole man: a man purely rational, not because his passions are extinct, but because they themselves would be right. Politics Marcus Aurelius In the section on divisions of philosophy , we have seen that Cleanthes was in politics a wholly owned division of philosophy. We also know that Zeno of Larnaca wrote a book on the Republic particularly known and admired throughout the ancient world. Plutarch gives us an idea by describing the intent of this lost work: "The Republic, a work much admired by Zeno, tends to point single master, we should not live in cities or divided into nations, each defined by its own criteria of justice, but we should regard all men as compatriots and fellow citizens, and there is a way of life and a unique world, like a flock feeding together in the same pasture under a common law. Zeno wrote it as if he had painted a picture of a dream or a picture of a good law and a philosophical Republic. "(From the Fortune of Alexander, 329 A - B). Influence of Stoicism The influence of Stoicism on Roman and Greek culture is considerable, few ancient thinkers were not to criticize the doctrine. This influence continued even after the conversion of the West to Christianity , some monasteries and erected with the manual of Epictetus, somewhat modified by internal rules. Stoicism is also perpetuated through the French philosophers such as Descartes , who declared that "it is better to change his desires rather than the world order" , from a Christian perspective: Pascal and, closer to home, Emile Brehier whose life and studies are strongly tinged with stoicism. Main periods of Stoicism We can distinguish the various schools or periods stoicism former Stoicism: Zeno of Larnaca (the founder, -301), and Cleanthes of Assos , first scolarque of Swing -262, Chrysippus , second in scolarque -232, Diogenes of Babylon , third in -205, and Antipater of Tarsus , fourth -150 the Middle Stoicism: Pantios Rhodes , fifth in scolarque -129, and Posidonius of Apamea , sixth -110 Stoicism Imperial or Stoic Latin : Seneca , who writes from 41, Epictetus , who founded a school in Nicopolis to 94, Marcus Aurelius , who instituted in 176 of the chairs of philosophy in Athens Stoicism pythagorizing: Posidonius of Apamea, stoic, spread Pythagoreanism; Diodotus, in Cicero, although Stoic, lived the Pythagorean way of life. "Most philosophers - Academic, Stoic, Peripatetic - pythagorisrent any way Rome " Stoicism Platonizing (from the first century BC.), with Antiochus of Ascalon (13 and last scolarque of the Academy of Plato in 86 BC.) Tryphon, Arius Didymus (late first century BC.) Alcinous the Philosopher (c. 150). "Since the first century BC., Stoicism and Platonism were so close that, without risking contradiction, one might say that a philosopher is both stoic and Platonic". Stoicism aristotlisant, eg. in the Treaty of the world (first century) a pseudo-Aristotle influenced by Alexandrian Posidonius of Apamea. Stoicism Christianizing among some Church Fathers , which Tertullian, Origen, Lactantius, Clement of Alexandria, St. Ambrose (On the duties of clerks) neo-Stoicism of Justus Lipsius (since 1584), Guillaume Du Vair (Moral philosophy of stoical, 1585), Pierre Charron (De la Wisdom, 1601). References Pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Epicureans, Stoics, but the explanations of the mythological world: everyone has a holistic point of view, trying to account for all of this is where we tend today ' Today specialize in disciplines According to a definition of the Stoics provided by Aetius , I, Preface 2 Seneca, Letters, 89, 4 to 5 Diogenes Laertius , Life, awards and doctrines of Eminent Philosophers, VII, 39 Chrysippus of Soli , From the speech, I and Physics I and these two books are lost cf. Sextus Empiricus , Against the Professors, VII, 19 cf. Chrysippus, in Plutarch , Contradictions of the Stoics, 1035 has Diogenes Laertius , ibid., VII, 39-41 Sextus Empiricus , ibid., VII, 19 Seneca , Letters to Lucilius, 89. Ammonius , On Aristotle's first Analytical, 8 and 9. Sextus Empiricus , ibid., VII, 19 Diogenes Laertius , ibid., VII, 39-41 Seneca , ibid., letter 89 John BROWN, Stoicism, 3rd edition, 1963, p. 58 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Philosophers, VII, 71-74 The disjunction is exclusive: either or. Nmsios of Emesa, of human nature, 38 Diogenes Laertius , VII, 88 in Discourse on Method, third maxim provisional Cicero, Tusculans, V, 113. Freyburger-Galland, Freyburger, Tautil, religious sects in Greece and Rome, Les Belles Lettres, 1986 211. Jerome Carcopino Basilica Pythagorean ..., p. 190. J. Whittaker, in Alcinous, teaching doctrines of Plato, Les Belles Lettres, 1990 X-XI. M. Spanneut, Stoicism Fathers of the Church, Paris, 2nd ed. 1969. Julien-Eymard d'Angers, Research Stoicism in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Olms, 1976. L. Zanta, The Rebirth of Stoicism in the sixteenth century, Paris, 1914. Bibliography Resource directories ancient philosophical: Bibliotheca Classica Selecta Cnrs Remacle Toulouse Academic Site Editions Stocorum veterum Fragmenta (SVF), ed. J. von Arnim, 4 vols. Leipzig, 1903-1924. T. I: Zeno and Zeno discipuli, 1905, t. II: Chrysippus fragmenta logica and physica, Leipzig, 1903, t. III: Chrysippus moralia fragmentation. Chrysippus succesorum Fragmenta, Leipzig, 1904; t. IV: Indices, ed. Mr. Adler, Leipzig, 1924. Is the reference edition, in Greek. The Stoics: Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, ed. by P.-M. Schuhl and. Brehier, Gallimard, coll. "Pliade, Paris, 1962 - ISBN 2-07-010541-5 The Stoics, choice of texts, ed. J. Brown, PUF, Paris, 1966 The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume II: The Stoics, ed. by Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley (1986), trans., Garnier-Flammarion, 2001. All quotations in this article are taken from the book. Sources Cicero : First Academic For goods and evils (Book III) Studies F. Baillot, Insights on stoicism, philosophical journal, Jan.-March, p. 14-30, 1952. E. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, Paris, 1927. Brehier Emile, Chrysippus and the old stoicism (Paris, 1910, reprinted 1951). Brehier Emile, The theory of intangibles in ancient Stoicism (Paris, 1907, repr. 1953). Emile Brehier Studies, Ancient Philosophy, Paris, 1955. Bridoux A., Stoicism and its influence, Paris, Vrin, 1965. Victor Brochard, Studies of ancient and modern philosophy. (Vrin, Paris, 1974). John Brown, Stoicism, Paris, PUF, coll. "What do I know?", 1958, 2nd ed., 1961. Jacques Brunschwig The Stoics and their logic (Paris, 1978). Daraki M. A religiosity without God: An Essay on the Stoics and St. Augustine Athens, Paris, 1989). Duhot Jean-Joel, The Stoic conception of causality, Paris, 1989. Duhot Jean-Joel, "Stoic Epictetus and wisdom", Paris, 1996, repr. Pocket, 2003. Victor Goldschmidt, system and Stoic ideas of time, Vrin, 1953, ed. inc. 1979. Gourinat JB, The Stoics and soul, Paris, PUF, 1996. Gourinat JB, The dialectic of the Stoics, Paris, Vrin, 2000. Octave Hamelin, On the logic of the Stoics, philosophical Year, 1902. Laffranque M., Posidonius of Apamea, PUF, 1964. Carlos Levy, The Hellenistic Philosophies (Paperback, 1997). Marha C., moralists under the Roman Empire, Paris, 1900. H. Meyer, Extension of Stoic logic in contemporary logic, Philosophical Review, III, p. 387, 1956. Joseph Moreau, The Soul of the world from Plato to the Stoics, Paris, 1939. Joseph Moreau, Epictetus, Paris, Seghers. Oger V., Essay on the system of the Stoics, Paris, 1885. Ravaison Felix, Essay on stoicism, Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, Paris, 1857 E. Renan , Marc-Aurele and the end of the ancient world, Paris, 1881. Robin Leo, The Morality antique, Paris, 1938. G. Rodis-Lewis, The Stoic Ethics, PUF, 1970. Roussot Thomas, "Marcus Aurelius and the Roman Empire", L'Harmattan, 2005. Schuhl Pierre-Maxime, The Dominator and possible, PUF, 1960. Antoinette Virieux-Reymond, logic and epistemology of the Stoics, Chambery, nd, 1949. AJ Voelker, the idea of will in Stoicism, Paris, PUF, 1973. Notes Related articles Epicurism Reason Natural Law External Links The Portique.net Fatum stoicum Freedom and moral responsibility in Stoicism The ancient Stoicism , by Emile Brehier Annotated Bibliography on Stoic logic Resource directories ancient philosophical: Bibliotheca Classica Selecta Cnrs Remacle Toulouse Academic Site div class = "noprint plainlinksneverexpand" style = "background-color: transparent; padding: 0; font-size: xx-small; color: # 000000; white-space: nowrap"> v of m Stoicism Zeno of cition Ariston of Chios Hrillos Carthage Dionysius of Heraclea Cleanthes Spheros Chrysippus of Soli Aristocron Diogenes of Babylon Pantios Rhodes Posidonios Cato of Utica Hcaton Rhodes Seneca Musonius Rufus Rubellius Plautus Thrasea Paetus Epictetus Marcus Aurelius Lipsius Hellenistic philosophy Stoicism Zeno of cition Ariston of Chios Hrillos Carthage Dionysius of Heraclea Cleanthes Spheros Chrysippus of Soli Diogenes of Babylon Pantios Rhodes Posidonios Cato of Utica Seneca Musonius Rufus Rubellius Plautus Thrasea Paetus Epictetus Marcus Aurelius Epicurism Epicurious Metrodorus of Lampsacus Hermarchus of Mytilene Polystratus Apollodorus Philodemus of Gadara Lucretia Skepticism Pyrrho of Elis Timon of Phlius Aenesidemus Agrippa Sextus Empiricus New Academy Arcesilaus of Pitane Carneades Clitomachus Carthage Philo of Larissa Antiochus of Ascalon Cicero Schools of ancient philosophy Presocratic Philosophy Ionian school ( School Milesian School Ephesian ) Pythagorean School Eleatic School Atomism sophistic Socratic philosophy Socrates Academy , Platonism ( Plato ) School , Peripatetic School ( Aristotle ) Cynicism Cyrenaica School Megarian School of Elis Hellenistic philosophy Garden of Epicurus , Epicureanism Stoicism Skepticism New Academy Neoplatonism ( Plotinus ) School of Alexandria Ancient Philosophy portal Ancient Greece Portal

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